ESS, QUO VADIS?

Ladda ner rapporten: Case-rapport ESS

I regeringens utrikesdeklaration för 2008 uttalades ett starkt stöd för byggandet av ESS i Lund: ”Regeringen har tagit initiativ till att i nära samarbete med övriga nordiska och baltiska länder, bygga en stor sameuropeisk forskningsanläggning, ”European Spallation Source” i Lund” (www.regeringen.se). Uttalandet är högst intressant eftersom inget definitivt beslut om tidpunkt för byggstart och placering tagits men samtidigt stärker det mandatet för att få ESS till Lund. Enligt den senaste rapporten från European Innovation Scoreboard befäster dessutom Sverige sin position som världens mest innovativa land (www.proinno-europe.eu). Detta är säkerligen en viktig variabel när det gäller att förhandla ESS till Lund.

ESS som företeelse berör en hel rad olika aspekter såsom regionalt samarbete, vetenskap, internationella förhandlingar, sameuropeisk finansiering och samhälls-påverkan. Samtidigt är det så att många av dem ofta kommer tillbaka till frågor om demokrati och effektivitet, dvs. grundläggande frågor om hur våra samhällen är uppbyggda och fungerar

Syfte

Policyprocesser är ytterst komplexa företeelser då de inkluderar en mängd aktörer, händelser, beslut, ageranden osv. som interagerar på olika nivåer under en längre tidsram (Sabatier, 2007 s. 3): “Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find some ways of simplifying the situation in order to have any chance of understanding it. One cannot look for, and see, everything.” (Sabatier, 2007 s. 4) . Sabatier menar därför att det är nödvändigt att göra begränsningar (Ibid). En möjlighet är att utgå från sin förförståelse eftersom den begränsar forskarens uppmärksamhet genom att det styr den i en viss riktning.

Vår förförståelse när det gäller ESS är att det finns process- och projektmässiga mönster i ESS som inte är unika även om såväl ESS-Scandinavias informationschef, Marianne Ekdahl, som regeringens chefsförhandlare, Allan Larsson, betonat det unika med ESS. Utgångspunkten är att ESS är ett fall av megaprojekt då det rör sig om ett projekt med ”strukturskapande effekter” (jmfr. Magnussons 2007). Givet denna utgångspunkt finns en rad olika aspekter att ta fasta på, men den gemensamma nämnaren är att megaprojekt ofta ger upphov till ett specifikt grundproblem, nämligen ett demokratiskt underskott (Flybjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter, 2007 s. 5). Problemet bottnar framförallt i ”[…] inadequate deliberation about risk and lack of accountability in the project decision-making process […]” (Ibid. s. 6). Anledningen är att ökat medborgardeltagande och större genomskinlighet antas generera tidsmässigt längre beslutsprocesser och suboptimala utfall (Ibid. s. 139). Här ställs alltså den idealtypiska deltagardemokratin explicit mot en effektiv och snabb beslutprocess. Vårt grundläggande syfte är problematisera denna utgångspunkt i relation till ESS. Mer specifikt är syftet att utifrån den angivna demokrati- och effektivitets-definitionen (se avsnitt 1.3) göra en scenariobeskrivning av beslutsprocessen för ESS.

Med utgångspunkt i diskussionen ovan avser vi att besvara följande frågeställning:

Givet definitionen av ESS som ett megaprojekt, i vilken utsträckning står deltagande och effektivitet i konflikt med varandra inom ramen för projektet?

Det är viktigt att poängtera att rapporten huvudsakligen återpeglar vår uppfattning av ESS eftersom den bygger på de analytiska konstruktioner vi valt ut, vilket innebär att ”where you stand can influence what you see” (Fischer, 2003 s. 213). Följaktligen gör vi inga anspråk på att presentera en bild av ESS som den rätta.

Ladda ner rapporter: Case-rapport ESS

March 10th, 2008

Without meta-narratives

Without meta-narratives

A meta-theory and its effect on the study of politics

1 Introduction

hile natural sciences strive towards providing truth, meaning and understanding while contributing towards change fewer and fewer people seem to believe that the social sciences can contribute more than one (rather than the) truth, meaning and understanding while perhaps striving towards change. I sense that it has become in to reject positivism in favor of hermeneutics. It would appear that the last lines of defense for the positivists are starting to crumble after decades of heavy shelling from an alliance of everyone from realists to hermeneutics and postmodernists. It has however not meant that the ideas of the positivist are dying – rather they tend to have fled their base camp to avoid the heavy shelling. Today these ideas dressed in realist uniforms have started a factionist army advocating many of their old beliefs while still waging war on their old brothers in arms.

Still, many scholars seem to take it for granted today that there is no one world to observe – that everything is interpreted though a layer of culture and paradigms which many but fever believe to, in turn, influence what is being observed. Very few, however, have chosen to accept that this also means that meta-narratives or nomothetical knowledge is impossible. I argue that the production of general truths or nomothetical knowledge is still seen by many as one of the main functions of social science – or as Thomas Brante puts it: “[…] the ultimate purpose of science is that it seeks to provide causal explanation of effects.” [orign. italics] (Brante, 2001, p. 172).

I fear that mainstream science isn’t far from silently declaring the end of history and the victory of constructivism and rational choice. Positivism has been rejected on account of not being applicable on the social sciences (Lundquist, 1993, p. 40ff) and relativism in turn has been rejected by many as not being constructive enough but rather skeptical and dogmatic (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994, p. 257f). In terms of ontology and epistemology, it is my opinion that most social scientists today has accepted a moderate position in-between these two camps where a great many choose not to show their ontological and epistemological colors (e.g., Brante, 2001, p.167). Scientists in general tend to accept that our understanding of the world depends on our cultural layers but most does, as stated above, not tend to adhere to the relativist position that nomothetical knowledge is impossible. Rather we have seen an attempt to fuse (in the words of Gadamer) the horizons and state that it is, or rather as it is often stated, that it must be possible to generate nomothetical knowledge as brought forth by e.g., Bernstein, Gadamer and Alvesson and Sköldberg et alii (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 1994, p. 57ff) or “[…] we must discard the larger part of sociological knowledge […]” (Brante, 2001, p. 173) in an attempt to “[…] rescue the sciences from relativism.” (Delanty, 1997, p. 38).

I find this position to be unsatisfactory ontologically as well as epistemologically. Rather than fully addressing the question of if all knowledge is constructed and if there can be universally valid social scientific knowledge – I feel that these issues are being avoided or left unanswered. The next section will further develop my purpose with this essay.

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this essay is to build an alternate meta-theoretical position which I argue is ontologically and epistemologically consistent to a larger extent than other similar structures. I have felt a good deal of dissatisfaction with the meta-theoretical frameworks which I have come into contact with so far. I have felt that the frameworks at hand have failed at incorporating an ontological and epistemological view which both addresses my own views while providing an adequate answer to the question of to what extent universally valid social knowledge is possible. I have personally felt forced to adhere to one framework of though. Either general knowledge is possible or it is not. I do not believe there can be a middle way or a diversion in the constructivist sense (Delanty, 1997, p. 131).

While postmodernism offers a meta-theoretical framework which deal with meta-narratives and general knowledge in a satisfactory way it fails to provide a sufficient degree of constructivism. Postmodernism risks being unable to provide much more than general theoretical, philosophical arguments and ideographic opinions. Or as McKinlay (1998) writes “Postmodernism […] has stumbled against the criticism that it fails to generate concrete proposals for political action or analysis” (McKinlay, 1998, p. 482).

This might be fine for some, but I find it unconstructive. Nor am I willing to leave my basic ontological and epistemological assumptions simply so that social science will be provided with a greater degree of meaning – like so many rationalists and constructivists seem to have done.

However, this essay will not be an exercise in logic trying to prove or disprove reality. I find such exercises futile and pointless since trying to prove or disprove any ontological and epistemological position is as abstract and meaningful as arguing about whether or not god exists. It has been tried for long enough without any apparent success – and this is not a philosophical paper.

Instead the purpose of this paper is to develop an ontological and epistemological position which is personally satisfactory and internally consistent and to assess what impact such a meta-theory might have on the study of political science. In short: Without meta-narratives: A meta-theory and its effect on the study of politics?

Download essay: Theory of Science for the Social Sciences – Final essay – Final Draft

January 20th, 2008